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NOTES
count need be in existence when the notice is filed.77 As has been con-
tended, this statute merely clarifies what a court in construing the present
statute should hold is the law in Ohio today.
It should be noted, albeit briefly, that the Uniform Commercial Code
does differ from the Ohio statute on the substantive question of the as-
signment of expectancies. It provides that a valid assignment can be
made of future accounts arising out of future contracts.78 This would
allow a greater use of "floating Hens," which Freedheim and Goldston
have pointed out can be utilized to some extent under our present
statute.
79
CONCLUSION
Since accounts receivable financing has become so important to our
economy, and because of its beneficial aspects, the law, as would be ex-
pected, has grown to adapt itself to the credit practices. It is necessary
that the law in this area be as dear and as settled as possible. Notice-
filing, while acceptable to the lending interests, has afforded an added
protection against secret liens, and reduced to some extent the possibili-
ties of fraud both to subsequent assignees and creditors. It seems a satis-
factory compromise between the two strong policies of protection of the
public and freedom for the lending interests.
The entire advantage of notice-filing for the commercial interests
would be destroyed by the construction that the filing of notice protected
only the assignments of accounts in existence when the nonce was filed.
Since this view neither conforms with business practices, nor is essential
for public protection, it should not be adopted as an interpretation of the
Ohio Accounts Receivable Act
JAmES H. BERICK
Remedies for the Consumer of Deleterious Food
There was a time when one did not speak of the '!rights" of a con-
sumer. In -those golden days of simplicity one could smugly encompass
the sum total of means -by which a consumer protected himself in the
oft-quoted maxim "buyer beware." Needless to say, it was not an onerous
task for the learned chancellor to arrive at a correct solution of a con-
sumer problem. But "-time," to quote an equally famous maxim, "marches
on." And on that march the courts have deigned -to afford several weap.
7 Ibtd.
-UNIFORM CoMWMRcAL CODE § 9-204(3).
' See, Freedheia and Goldston, supra note 47, at 85.
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ons to the consumer. The progress of modern civilization has seen more
and more attempts to compensate the product-consuming public. As the
lines of -battle array themselves, we find that their configurations are
the results of diametrically opposed pressures. Manufacturers and re-
tailers have attempted to limit their liability while on the other hand the
consumer strives for greater protection than ever before.
Gradually the scope of protection broadened, encompassing such
items as automobiles,' medicines,2 oils,3 drugs,4 coffee urns,5 and restau-
rants.6 Food has similarly been afforded protection against contamination
-introduced by retailer and/or manufacturer. The grounds for recovery
against a manufacturer and a retailer are usually predicated upon theories
of either tort or contract or both. Each of these doctrinal tools, however,
contains some inherent obstacle which prevents it from being the panacea
of the consumer. When pursuing a recovery upon theories of contract
the ultimate consumer encounters a serious difficulty in the problem of
privity of contract. On the other hand, utilization of tort theories, al-
though avoiding .the problem of privity, presents the difficulty of proving
negligence on the part of the manufacturer or retailer. Whether the ulti-
mate consumer can recover from the manufacturer or retailer, and whether
the theory of recovery will be based on tort or contract are questions on
which the courts heartily disagree.
TORT RE mIEs
There is no doubt that all courts will hold a retailer of food liable
for the sale of deleterious food if he did in fact make an inspection of
the food.7  Liability will similarly be imposed upon the retailer if he in
all reasonableness should have known of the contamination in the products
which he has sold.8 A majority of the courts, however, has refused to
impose tort liability as long as the retailer had no reasonable grounds for
believing that he should inspect -the food product or if he had no
opportunity to make an inspection.9 For such reasons courts have been
'McPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
'Abbott Laboratories v. Lapp, 78 F. 2d 170 (7th Cir. 1935).
8 Merchant's Bank v. Sherman, 215 Ala. 370, 110 So. 805 (1926).
'Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852).
5Statler v. Ray Mfg. Co., 195 N.Y. 478, 88 N.E. 1063 (1909).
'Yochem v. Gloria, Inc., 134 Ohio St. 427, 17 N.E. 2d 731 (1938).
'Armour & Co. v. Leasure, 177 Md. 393, 9A. 2d 572 (1939); Johnson v. Stoddard,
310 Mass. 232, 37 N.E. 2d 505 (1941), see 36 CoRPus Juius SiEcuNDum, Food,
§ 59 (1943).
8 Albany Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Shiver, 63 Ga. App. 755, 12 S.E. 2d 114 (1940).
9Kratz v. American Stores Co., 359 Pa. 335, 59 A. 2d 138 (1948).
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reluctant to apply the doctrine of res ispa loquitur in suits against a re-
tailer -for ithe sale of contaminated food. 0
Several states have, however, passed pure food laws'1 the effect of
which is .to impose strict liability upon the retailer for selling unwhole-
some food. A violation of these pure food laws has been held by the
courts co constitute negligence per se.'2 Liability is imposed upon the
vendor even though -he had no knowledge -that the food was contaminated.
By basing his theory of recovery upon tort rather than contract, the
consumer receives an immediate benefit: the problem of privity does not
present itself.' 3 On the other hand, unless suit is instituted in a jurisdic-
tion which holds that violation of its pure food laws is negligence per se,
other obstacles to recovery are still present
The Ohio Pare Food Law
Ohio has taken its stand with those jurisdictions which maintain that
violation of the pure food law constitutes negligence per se.14 Only by
employing such a -theory can the retailer be found negligent in selling
deleterious canned food for it will understandably be a rare situation in
which a retailer would find cause to inspect a sealed can. The original
pure food law in Ohio was passed 'in 1831.5 An amendment to the
statute was passed in 1896, eliminating the necessity of proving knowl-
edge on the part of the seller.'6  Absolute liability is not imposed upon
the retailer under this statute, 'however, and contributory negligence may
,be raised as an affirmative defense by the retailer.' 7
The gradual growth in Ohio of protection for the product consuming
'Lipari v. National Grocery Co., 120 N.J.L. 97, 198 Ad. 393 (1938).
" GA. CODE 5 42-101 (1954); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 27-101 (1947); TEx.
REV. CIV. STAT. art. 4470 (1951 ed.).
Donaldson v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 186 Ga. 870, 199 S.E. 213 (1938);
Kelley v. John R. Daily Co., 56 Mont. 63, 181 Pac. 326 (1919); Walker v. Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 131 Texas 57, 112 S.W. 2d 170 (1938).
'See Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REV.
117 (1943).
"'Portage Markets Co. v. George, 111 Ohio St. 775, 146 N.E. 283 (1924); The
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Hughes, 131 Ohio St. 501, 3 N.E. 2d 415(1936); Drock v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 61 Ohio App. 291, 22 N.E. 2d
547 (1939).
529 OHIo LAws 152 (1831).
"The present statute is OHIo REv. CODE § 3715.21. "No person shall sell, offer
for sale, or have in his possession with intent to sell, diseased, corrupted, adulterated,
or unwholesome provisions without making the condition thereof known to the
buyer."
' Leonardi v. Habermann Provision Co., 143 Ohio St. 623, 56 N.E. 2d 232 (1944);
Kurth v. Krumme, 143 Ohio St. 638, 56 N.E. 2d 227 (1944).
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public has been as inexorable as -it is laudable. The Portage Market Co.
case,"8 decided in 1924, remains the leading case in the area of retailer
liability under the provisions of the pure food law. In the Portage
Market Co. case a purchaser of unwholesome meat was held to be entitled
to recovery against the retailer. But whether the pure food laws applied
to canned goods and to consumers other than the purchaser was left un-
answered.
In 1944, the Supreme Court of Ohio provided an affirmative answer
to the former problem. In Wolfe v. The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea
Co.,"9 the court stated, in speaking of the pure food law, that "Section
12760,20 General Code, contains no exception ,in respect of provisions
contained in cans or other original packages and we are not justified in
reading any exception into the statute."
Further clarification was supplied by the court in the case of Drock v.
The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co.2 The court, in the Drock
case, cited the Portage Market Co. case with approval and added that the
protection of the pure food law did not run solely to the purchaser.
Others, too, might benefit, as the members of the purchaser's family did
in that instance.
Liability of the Manufacturer
A consumer bringing suit against a manufacturer for the sale of
deleterious food, though favorably received by the courts, nevertheless is
confronted with -the formidable hurdle of proving -negligence, which has
often times proved fatal to such a suit.22 Manifestly, the injured plaintiff
will rarely have any direct proof of what has happened at the manu-
facturer's factory. Recognizing the difficulty, many courts have permitted
an application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.23 Several jurisdictions
have proceeded one step further and have held that such a manufacturer,
by violating the pure food laws, is negligent per se.24 Two states, Penn-
'Portage Markets Co. v. George, 111 Ohio St. 775, 146 N.E. 283 (1924).
1'143 Ohio St. 643, 56 N.E. 2d 230 (1944).
"OiHo Rnv. CODE 3715.21.
= 61 Ohio App. 291, 22 N.E. 2d 547 (1939). Subsequent affirmation of this
doctrine was granted by the Ohio Supreme Court in Leonardi v. Habermann Pro-
vision Co., 143 Ohio St. 623, 56 N.E. 2d 232 (1944).
'Joynes v. Jones Fine Bread Co., 147 S.W. 2d 1112 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941); John-
ston v. Swift & Co., 186 Miss. 803, 191 So. 423 (1939).
'Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 39 Cal. 2d 436, 247 P. 344 (1952); Paolinelli
v. Dainty Foods Manufacturers, 322 IIl. App. 586, 54 N.E. 2d 759 (1944); Ortego
v. Nehi Bottling Works, 199 La. 599, 6 S. 2d 677 (1942).
" Hertzler v. Manshum, 228 Mich. 416, 200 N.W. 155 (1924); Culbertson v. Coca
Cola Bottling Co., 157 S.C. 352, 154 S.E. 424 (1930); Burnette v. Augusta Coca
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sylvania and Kansas, when dealing with food cases have placed the 'burden
of producing evidence of due care upon both retailer and manufacturer
when they are sued together.2 5
Ohio Wrestles with the Torts Problem
Language utilized by the Ohio Supreme Court in Canton Provision
Co. v. Gauder26 and Ktiess v. Armour & Co.,2 7 indicates that a manu-
facturer of unwholesome food will be held liable under the Ohio pure
food law. The problem has not been squarely met since both cases dealt
primarily with procedural problems. 8  Perhaps -the best rationale for
imposing liability upon a manufacturer in such a situation can be found
in the Kniess case:
"Public policy demands that care and caution should be exacted from
manufacturers of food who sell for the purposes of general disposition
and sale to the general public."'
One of the leading cases in Ohio ° imposing liability on the manu-
facturer indicated that resort to the doctrine of r,-s ipsa loquitur was un-
necessary: "The presence of the needle in -the cake bearing the name of
the Ward Baking Company is an evidential fact from which negligence
may 'be inferred."31 Basic tort considerations should permit a finding of
negligence against the manufacturer. Applying the classic test of "fore-
seeability" to such a situation, it is elemental that when goods are sold to
a dealer, nothing is more certain than that they will be re-sold to a
consumer. If the product -is unwholesome the person injured thereby falls
well within the limits of legal causation. It should not shock even the
foremost legal sensitivists that there should be imposed a duty on the
manufacturer when his affirmative conduct is so likely to affect the
physical interests of others.
Moving beyond considerations of negligence, it would even seem
feasible to apply the concept of strict liability to the manufacturer. A
can of food containing deleterious substances which causes injury is cer-
Cola Bottling Co., 157 S.C. 359, 154 S.E. 645 (1930). And see annot., 98 A.L.R.
1496 (1935).
'Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P. 2d 317 (1953); Loch v. Confair, 372 Pa.
212, 93 A. 2d 451 (1953).
1130 Ohio St. 43, 196 NE. 634 (1935).
p134 Ohio St. 432, 17 N.E. 2d 734 (1938).
" Both cases dealt with the validity of joining the retailer and the packer as parties
defendant.
' Kniess v. Armour & Co., 134 Ohio St. 432, 442, 17 N.E. 2d 734, 738 (1938).
'Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 NE. 557 (1928).
tnIbid, at 485.
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tainly analogous to injury from any of the dangerous instrumentalities
for which recovery is readily granted by the courts. Justification for use
of the doctrine can 'be based on the fact that it is normally applied in
situations involving a high degree of risk of harm to others. Since the
health of the consumer is placed in jeopardy each time he takes a spoon-
ful of food, it would be a distinctly progressive step for a court to hold
the manufacturer strictly liable.
CoNTRACr REMEDIES
Another doctrinal 'tool which is available to a consumer in a suit
against the retailer is the breach of warranty. Numerous states have
adopted the Uniform Sales Act to facilitate the use of this concept. The
Uniform Sales Act3 2 deals with warranties in various situations. Section
1315.16(A) provides 'in essence, that a seller warrants the goods he
sells as being fit for normal use. Two conditions, however, must be pres-
ent to allow recovery under this section: 1) it is necessary that the seller
'be informed, either expressly or impliedly, of the purpose for which the
goods are purchased, and 2) reliance must have been placed upon the
seller's skill or judgment by the purchaser. Such a rigid requirement
inevitably results in a finding that reliance is lacking in the purchase of
foods because the consumer usually chooses his own food in a super-
market or else requests the item by its trade name. Nevertheless courts
have imposed liability upon a retailer based on the implied warranty of
general merchantability which is provided for under section 1315.16(B)
of the Uniform Sales Act. The latter section, then, will be utilized 'by the
consumer under the more commonplace situation.
Section 1315.16(D) of the Act provides that no implied warranty
of fitness attaches where there is a sale by -trade name. But courts have
held this section inapplicable where an implied warranty of general mer-
chantability under section 1315.16(B) -is found to exist33 much as the
courts have done in a situation involving section 1315.16(A) and sec-
tion 1315.16(B). The definition of what constitutes merchantable
quality has been stated as "reasonably suitable for the ordinary uses it was
manufactured to meet" 34 or "salable as goods of the general kind which
they were.., supposed to 'be when 'bought."35
mOHIo REv. CoDE, 1315.01-1315.76. Hereinafter the applicable sections of the
Uniform Sales Act will be cited according to their Ohio Revised Code sections.
' Goljatowska v. Albrecht Co., 17 Ohio L. Abs. 294 (Cr. App. 1934); Dow Drug
Co. v. Nieman, 57 Ohio App. 190, 13 N.E. 2d 130 (1936).
" Giant Manufacturing Co. v. Yates-American Machine Co., 111 F. 2d 360 (8th
Cir. 1940).
8'WILLISTON, SALES § 243 (3rd ed. 1948).
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In dealing with implied warranties, problems of privity arise which
were avoided under tort theories. Quite often courts have taken the
position that the implied warranties provided -by the Uniform Sales Act
which pertain to the usual sale of any product inures only to those who
-have had contractual relations with the retailer.8 6 This seems to 'be a
less advanced line of thinking.3 7 If legislative intent -is to be given any
meaning whatever, it is apparent that protection against unwholesome
food is the prime aim of the statute. It should be of no consequence
that the consumer of the deleterious substance has not parted with the
magical coins which will assure him of success in court Responsibility
for sound, healthy food should extend to any and all consumers whether
,they be purchasers thereof or not.
In accordance with a similar train of thought, courts have employed
various rationalizations for justifying the imposition of liability upon the
retailer. Some courts circumvent the difficulty of -the privity require-
ment by imposing liability upon the retailer -to encourage him in .the
exercise of more care in future selection.3 8 Other courts have said that
the retailer is in a better position .to know the reliability of the manu-
facturer.3 9 Since the manufacturer is quite often -located in another
state, some jurisdictions permit the consumer to sue the retailer because it
is inconvenient for the consumer to bring suit against the manufacturer.40
The Uniform Sales Act41 has been the source of much difficulty for
the Ohio courts. Much of the confusion can 'be traced to the language
used by the Ohio Supreme Court in several decisions.
In examining the question of whether a retailer who sells unwhole-
some canned food can be held liable under the Act for breach of war-
ranty we are confronted with the Supreme Court case of McMurray vt.
Vaughn's Seed Store,42 and more particularly, the fourth syllabus thereof.
That syllabus states:
1J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co. v. Dulworth, 216 Ky. 637, 287 S.W. 994
(1925); Paull v. McBride, 273 Mich. 661, 263 N.W. 877 (1935); Turner v. Edi-
son Storage Battery Co., 248 N.Y. 73, 161 N.E. 423 (1928).
'Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N. W. 382 (1920); Ander-
son v. Tyler, 223 Iowa 1033, 274 N.W. 48 (1937); See Perkins, Unwholesome
Food as a Source of Liability, 5, IOWA L.B. 86 (1919).
'Degouveia v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co., 231 Mo. App. 447, 100 S.W. 2d 336
(1936).
'Ward v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 231 Mass. 90, 120 NE. 225 (1918).
'
0 Griffin v. James Butler Grocery Co., 108 N.J.L 92, 156 Ad. 636 (1931). The
extent to which courts will reach for their rationalizations is most obvious in this
instance since the ease with which a manufacturer may be found to be doing busi-
ness within a state is well known.
"OHo Rnv. CODE § 1315.01-1315.76.
'2117 Ohio St. 236, 157 NE. 567 (1927).
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"Where a dealer sells an article of merchandise in the original package
as it comes from the manufacturer, and the consumer buys it knowing there
has been no inspection by the dealer, there is no implied warranty and in
the absence of an express warranty or representation, such dealer is not
liable to the purchaser for damages caused by any deleterious substance
in such merchandise, of the presence of which he had no knowledge."
(Emphasis supplied)
The existence of the syllabus rule43 in Ohio gives a certain import to
the court's holding. Yet it is 'interesting to note that the sole question
involved in the McMurray case was whether a purchaser-defendant would
be allowed to cross-petition in tort against the retailer-plaintiff who had
sued in contract to obtain the price of several bags of fertilizer which
contained crop-destroying materials. Unquestionably the fourth syllabus
in .the Mclrray case was dictum.
Subsequent to the ruling in the infamous McMarray case, several
courts of appeals dealt with -the problem. In 1934, Mrs. Goljatowska pur-
chased a can of pork and beans which contained, to her chagrin, an iron
nut.4 4  The court of appeals decided that section 1315.16(D) of the
Sales Act, which provided that no implied warranty arose when an article
was purchased by its trade name, was inapplicable when action is brought
under section 1315.16(B) of the Act which provides -for merchantable
quality in goods purchased. The syllabus set out in the McMurray case
was said to be mere dictum and therefore not controlling. The court held
that -the retailer was liable upon the merchantability warranty if the
article contained deleterious materials .although no opportunity for in-
spection was available to the retailer.45
Despite the fact that the McMurray case -has not been expressly over-
ruled, the subsequent court of appeals case is indicative of .the modern
trend toward the protection of consumers from unwholesome food. Health
being as important as life itself, the public is demanding, and has a
right to demand, that the victuals they put into their mouths be free from
taint. The public, through the courts, 'has placed the burden on industry.
It is a burden in the nature of a trust and requires that -proper selection
and preparation of food will be carried out. This is necessitated because
we are no longer a predominantly agrarian society in which the indi-
vidual is relatively self-sufficient for his sustenance. The days in which
"Rule VI, Rules of Practice of the Ohio Supreme Court.
" Golatowska v. Albrecht Co., 17 Ohio L. Abs. 294 (Ct. App. 1934).
"This principle was similarly enunciated in Dow Drug Co. v. Nieman, 57 Ohio
App. 190, 13 N.E. 2d 130 (1936); The court held that the Sales Act imposed the
merchantability warranty despite the fact that the product was sold under its trade
name and in the original package. The court repeated that the McMurray syllabus
was mere dictum and voiced its opinion that the clear language of the statute should
be enforced.
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the general store was available for the few staples required by an agrarian
society have vanished. We are dependent now, dependent on others.
As Cardozo stated:
"The dealer, as well as manufacturer or grower, affirms as to anything
he sells, if purchased by description, that it is of merchantable quality.
The burden is heavy. It is one of the hazards of business.""
Apparently the burden -has not been too disproportionate inasmuch as
The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company, so often involved in Ohio
cases, has declared its one hundred and twenty-sixth consecutive dividend.
THE WARRANTY THAT CoULD HAvE RUN
Concerning the problem of whether the warranty will -rn .to the family
and guests of the consumer, there is a dearth of material. With the ex-
ception of dictum in one Ohio Supreme Court case the problem has gone
unanswered. In Gander v. The Canton Provision Co.47 ;the plaintiff
brought his action against both the retailer and the packer. The deter-
minative issue was a procedural one, resulting in a finding that the de-
fendants could not be joined -in tort because the packer was primarily
liable and -the retailer secondarily liable. By way of dictum the court
went on to say that:
"An implied contract of warranty requires a meeting of the minds the
same as does an express contract. There was no privity of contract between
the plaintiff and either defendants for the petition alleges that the liver
pudding was purchased by the plaintiff's mother. Any liability that exists
in the instant case, therefore, necessarily arises out of tort."
Nevertheless, in 1944, a court of appeals in Leonardi v. The Haber-
mann Provision Co.,48 ignored the holding of -the Gander case in much
the same way as .the court in the Goljatowsko case passed over the Mc-
Murray case. Strong language once more emanated from a court of ap-
peals:
"... those who as retailers sell such negligently prepared food to the retail
trade must be held liable either because of breach of warranty or for a
violation of the pure food statutes to any person damaged by the proper
use of such food."" (Emphasis supplied)
The decision of the court was affirmed by the Ohio Supreme Court on
the basis of the pure food law, neglecting to state whether breach of
warranty rights would be available to all consumers, only one of whom
"Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931).
'"130 Ohio St. 43, 196 N.E. 634 (1935).
"39 Ohio L. Abs. 253, 52 N.E. 2d 85 (Ct. App. 1944).
"Ibid, at 260.
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had contractual relations with the retailer. The language used by the
court follows one theme: liability should be imposed and it is inconse-
quential under which doctrine the court should base its decision.
WARRANTIES AND THE MANUFACTURER
According to the usual statement of the law, implied warranties under
the Uniform Sales Act will only benefit those who have entered into
contractual relations with the manufacturer.50 In order to permit recovery
by the non-contracting consumer, in such instances, courts have seen fit
to relax the rigid requirement of privity under various theories. Some
courts have negated the necessity of privity entirely in suits against the
manufacturer."' Other courts maintain that the warranty runs with the
food and accompanies it wherever it goes in much the same manner as
covenants run with the land.52 At least one court has held that the plain-
tiff-purchaser becomes the assignee of the retailer's rights to maintain
suit against the manufacturer and consequently should be permitted to
sue.53 Another court has stated that these contracts are, in reality, third
party beneficiary contracts and thus privity finds fulfillment.5 4
PROTECTION FOR THE NON-PURCHASER
One Ohio court of appeals, in the case of Ward Baking Co. v. Triz-
zino,5 5 has taken a laudable straightforward approach to the topic:
"We are content to place ourselves in the category of the minority
states, if such be the case, and to hold that there is imposed the absolute
liability of a warrantor on the manufacturer of food in favor of the ulti-
mate purchaser, even though there are no direct contractual relationships
between such ultimate purchaser and the manufacturer."
Unfortunately the Ohio Supreme Court, in the Canton Provision Co.5 O
case, did not acquiesce. The court, in a dogmatic approach to the prob-
lem, reiterated the legalistic doctrine that an implied contract of war-
WWelshausen v. Charles Parker Co., 83 Conn, 231, 76 At. 271 (1910); Pelletier
v. Dupont, 124 Me. 269, 128 Ad. 186 (1925); Wood v. Advance Rumely Thresher
Co., 60 N.D. 384, 234 N.W. 517 (1931).
'Blanton v. Cudahy Packing Co., 154 Fla. 872, 19 S. 2d 313 (1944); Jacob E.
Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W. 2d 828 (1942).
"Patargias v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 332 II1. App. 117, 74 N.E. 2d 162 (1947);
Anderson v. Tyler, 223 Iowa 1033, 274 N.W. 48 (1937); Jaccarezza v. Sanguinetti,
71 Cal. App. 2d 687, 163 P. 2d 470 (1945).
'Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N.W. 382 (1920).
"Dryden v. Continental Baking Co., 11 Cal. 2d 33, 77 P. 2d 833 (1938).
'27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928).
'Canton Provision Co. v. Gander, 130 Ohio St. 43, 196 N.E. 634 (1935).
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ranty required a meeting of the minds.57 Since the tainted lver pudding
was purchased by the plaintiff's mother it was held that there was no
privity of contract.
Three years later, the same court decided the case of Kniess v. Armour
& Co.58 After examining the various theories -under which liability
has been imposed upon the manufacturer the court stated that ".. . the
manufacturer or packer warrants to the public generally that the food
produced is fit for human consumption." Again it must be reiterated
that the impact of the court's words is vitiated by the fact that it is clearly
dicta.
Let us suppose that Y purchases unwholesome -food manufactured by
M. Subsequently, Y invites X to dinner. X consumes it, and becomes
violently ill. Does X have a cause of action against M based upon the
theory of warranty? According -to the wording and thought behind the
Kniess case, as well as the recent trend, protection to the guest would be
afforded. And correctly so. Though X has in no way come into direct
contact with M he should be protected against deleterious foodstuffs.
The policy of the law to protect the health and life of the produce-
consuming public would merely be half served if liability is made to de-
pend upon classical contractual warranty. Privity of contract and reliance
on the skill and judgment of the manufacturer would be made a requisite
for recovery in each case. Under such a rule, although a guest should
accompany the host and aid -in selecting the food, the -host alone could
recover for the injuries caused by deleterious substances contained there-
in on the theory that there would be no contractual relation between the
guest and the manufacturer.
CONCLUSION
The chances of recovery by the ultimate consumer in Ohio are greatly
enhanced when suit is instituted in tort under the pure -food law. At-
tempted recovery under the provisions of the Uniform Sales Act is less
certain of success because of dictum put forth by the Ohio Supreme Court
to the effect that the consumer must be in privity with the vendor in
order to recover.
Under general considerations of tort law it is virtually impossible to
separate theories which apply to dangerous instrumentalities from those
dealing with food. The scope of protection should be equally broad in
both situations. Liability without requiring a showing of fault should be
imposed from the standpoint of a public policy which is aimed at pro-
7 Ibid, at 48.
c' 134 Ohio St. 432, 17 NE. 2d 734 (1938).
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